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While “classical” human identity has kept philosophers busy since millennia, “Digital
Identity” seems primarily machine related. Telephone numbers, E-Mail inboxes, or
Internet Protocol (IP)-addresses are irrelevant to define us as human beings at first
glance. However, with the omnipresence of digital space the digital aspects of identity
gain importance. In this submission, we aim to put recent developments in context and
provide a categorization to frame the landscape as developments proceed rapidly. First,
we present selected philosophical perspectives on identity. Secondly, we explore how
the legal landscape is approaching identity from a traditional dogmatic perspective both
in national and international law. After blending the insights from those sections together
in a third step, we will go on to describe and discuss current developments that are
driven by the emergence of new tools such as “Distributed Ledger Technology” and “Zero
Knowledge Proof.” One of our main findings is that the management of digital identity
is transforming from a purpose driven necessity toward a self-standing activity that
becomes a resource for many digital applications. In other words, whereas traditionally
identity is addressed in a predominantly sectoral fashion whenever necessary, new
technologies transform digital identity management into a basic infrastructural service,
sometimes even a commodity. This coincides with a trend to take the “control” over
identity away from governmental institutions and corporate actors to “self-sovereign
individuals,” who have now the opportunity to manage their digital self autonomously.
To make our conceptual statements more relevant, we present several already existing
use cases in the public and private sector. Subsequently, we discuss potential risks that
should be mitigated in order to create a desirable relationship between the individual,
public institutions, and the private sector in a world where self-sovereign identity
management has become the norm. We will illustrate these issues along the discussion
around privacy, as well as the development of backup mechanisms for digital identities.
Despite the undeniable potential for the management of identity, we suggest that
particularly at this point in time there is a clear need to make detailed (non-technological)
governance decisions impacting the general design and implementation of self-sovereign
identity systems.
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INTRODUCTION
As mankind continues its journey through the Digital Age our
lives are increasingly becoming compositions of our offline and
online activities. While the dimensions of “classical” human
identity have kept philosophers busy since millennia1, traditional
thinking about “Digital Identity” is primarily machine related.
Telephone numbers, E-Mail inboxes, or Internet Protocol (IP)-
addresses seem to be irrelevant to define us as human beings at
first glance. However, the discussion about surveillance in the
digital domain (Council of Europe, 2018), and jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) struggling to clarify under
which conditions IP-addresses should be qualified as personal
data (ECJ, 2018; Gstrein and Ritsema van Eck, 2018, p. 80–81),
show in detail how these technical necessities make it increasingly
difficult to distinguish between our offline and online selves.
The omnipresence of digital technology and its use to not only
control, but also shape society result in the need to reconsider
our world and ourselves as beings (Galič et al., 2017). The
technological component of the amalgamation that we call “me”
has increased considerably in the last decades (Kucklick, 2014,
p. 189–235). When looking at these changes from a holistic
perspective, it is almost natural to deduct that this digital space
as parallel space does not mirror existing governance structures,
power relations, human rights, and legal obligations. “Code is
Law”—or at least has sometimes normative authority—and as it
spreads across our lives new governance decisions are made by
those who shape it in an ex- or implicit manner (Lessig, 1996, p.
1–9). Furthermore, it is not only governmental surveillance and
“nudging” that shapes our digital identities right from the start,
there is also “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 11–12).
In an attempt to create an explicit and universal process,
the United Nations (UN) in late 2013 have made a cautious
start to address these developments by “[r]ecognizing that the
same rights that people have offline must also be protected
online.” (United Nations, 2014, p. 2). In 2018 they called
upon states to “[. . . ] consider developing or maintaining and
implementing adequate legislation, in consultation with all
relevant stakeholders, including civil society, with effective
sanctions and appropriate remedies, that protects individuals
against violations and abuses of the right to privacy, namely
through the unlawful and arbitrary collection, processing,
retention or use of personal data by individuals, governments,
business enterprises and private organizations [. . . ]” (United
Nations, 2018, p. 6). In this spirit and to ensure that specifically
digital identities live up to these requirements, the UN have
supported the creation of the ID2020 Alliance2. As noble as these
intentions might be, large corporations such as those assembled
under the GAFAM acronym (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon,
Microsoft) continue their considerable efforts to create a general
identity for logins of digital services they themselves or others
1For illustrative purposes a bridge can be built from Aristotle who framed the
human as “political animal,” to Rene Descartes “rational self ” in the context of
“cogito ergo sum,” further to Martin Heidegger’s existence or “Dasein”: Dieses
Seiende, das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem die Seinsmöglichkeit des
Fragens hat, fassen wir terminologisch als Dasein.
2Available online at: https://id2020.org (accessed March 4, 2020).
provide. It is practically impossible to activate the holy grail
of expression in the digital age—the modern smartphone—
without one or more accounts that are associated with those big
players. However, since these actions result in siloed identities
tied to proprietary services and applications (Verborgh, 2019),
the advent of digital identity systems based on Blockchain and
similar Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) might offer the
opportunity for change.
More than a decade ago, Cameron (2005) formulated seven
laws of identity aiming to guide the way from a patchwork of
identity one-offs to a universal identity. Cameron’s visionary
view on the subject of identity, claims and privacy led him to
formulate the following principles: (1) user control and consent;
(2) minimal disclosure for a constrained use; (3) justifiable
parties; (4) directed identity; (5) pluralism of operators and
technologies; (6) human integration; (7) consistent experience
across contexts. While it would go too far to explain each of them
in detail, one can summarize that Cameron laid the foundational
principles that many actors in the field of digital identity are
aiming for. Only today, first attempts to a universal identity are
made, but the reality remains that the individual is composed of
a patchwork of identities, logins, usernames, passwords, etc.
The obstacle to an overarching digital-identity is the
enforcement of one standard in cyberspace, as the battle
over single-log-on’s between Google and Facebook illustrates.
Interestingly enough, the solution might not be found in the
private, but in the public sector. For example, the Netherlands
are using a progressive digital identity management system called
“DigiD” which allows residents access to public records and
governmental services since several years3. Furthermore, Georgia
and Sweden used blockchain technology to create an immutable
record of land titles, identifying individuals as landowners
(Nimfuehr, 2018). The World Food Programme pioneered a
similar Blockchain guided approach to biometric ID and digital
payments with which refugees in a camp in Jordan could reserve
funds and buy goods, without needing physical documents or
valets (Juskalian, 2018; Wang and De Filippi, 2020, p. 14–17).
Furthermore, the European Union (EU) is contemplating digital
identity with the ascend of Schengen II and works on themobility
of identity related credentials in its member states through
the implementation of the eIDAS Directive (EU Regulation
No 910/2014).
Additionally, the concept of “self-sovereign identity” is
emerging. While there is currently no universally and legally
binding definition of the concept, Allen (2016) has described
it as “[. . . ] the next step beyond user-centric identity and that
means it begins at the same place: the user must be central
to the administration of identity.” He goes on to propose ten
principles that aim at describing the main characteristics of
self-sovereign identity. Wang and De Filippi (2020, p. 9–11)
discuss his proposal in-depth, and together with the relationship
to so-called decentralized identifiers (DIDs), which are a form
of URLs (e.g., unique web addresses) that resolve to a DID
3Available online at: https://www.digid.nl/en/what-is-digid (accessed March
4, 2020).
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 26
Zwitter et al. Digital Identity and the Blockchain
document (Wang and De Filippi, 2020, p. 9)4. Wagner et al.
(2018, p. 27) have proposed to define self-sovereign identity
as “a model of digital identity where individuals and entities
alike are in full control over central aspects of their digital
identity, including their underlying encryption keys; creation,
registration, and use of their decentralized identifiers [. . . ] The
architecture gives individuals and entities the power to directly
control and manage their digital identity without the need to
rely on external authorities.” In other words, DLT becomes an
infrastructure for the creation of verifiable credentials. It allows
to verify claims with (increased) independence of governments
or powerful intermediaries. Ultimately, this new approach could
replace conventional “legal identities.”
Furthermore, if such self-sovereign identity management
includes verification of claims based on “zero-knowledge proof”
(ZKP) technology, the need to exchange and register “raw”
personal data on platforms could be limited significantly.Wagner
et al. (2018, p. 48) describe ZKP by stating that its “[. . . ] use
allows two different actors, the “prover” and the “verifier” to
exchange the ownership of a piece of data, without actually
revealing the data. The math, probability and cryptography
behind this technology makes their application useful in for
example allowing the verifier to prove the ownership of a
credential to the verifier, such as a driving license [sic!] without
revealing the identifier it has been initially issued to.”
However, all of these attempts do not consider how identity
is constructed from a philosophical perspective, what the
legal consequences attached to identity look like, and what
a universal digital identity should mean. This general lack
of understanding of philosophical and legal underpinnings of
identity remains prevalent. Nevertheless, upon closer scrutiny
this is not surprising. As illustrated below, the concept of
identity is ill-defined in the legal domain, and an attempt to
define it spans many different fields with relevant norms in
national and international legislation, as well as consideration of
corresponding jurisprudence. In order to shed light onto what
identity is composed of in practice, this paper presents:
1. An overview of selected philosophical perspectives
on identity;
2. An overview of legal aspects of identity;
3. Expressions of identity and ways of identification;
4. A categorization of digital identity;
5. A discussion of opportunities and risks around
digital identity.
With this primer on digital identity that includes perspectives
on self-sovereign identity, we respectfully submit that before
we are even able to seek a sustainable technological solution,
identity as a concept should be carefully considered, taking into
account the development of cyberspace from a philosophical,
legal, and ethical perspective. We acknowledge that major strides
toward digital identity are currently being undertaken by the
DLT community. Furthermore, it is not our aim to replicate
and review the significant number of purely technology-related
4Available online at: https://w3c.github.io/did-core/#introduction (accessed
March 4, 2020).
FIGURE 1 | Continuum of identity.
blogs and white papers written on the subject. Rather, we aim to
contribute to the concept of digital identity from a philosophical
and legal perspective. Thereby, this paper aims to counteract the
current trend to immediately jump on technology on the peak of
the “hype-cycle” and present it as panacea for all problems.
Another important disclaimer is that this paper does not treat
digital identity as belonging to DLT exclusively. DLT is just one
of many tools that are currently being deployed. Hence other,
more centralized systems will also be discussed in their own
right. Once these elements are profoundly understood in a larger
context and from a legal and philosophical perspective, they
can function as determinants of what we need technology to




The concept of identity in philosophy has many different aspects.
Identity plays a central role in logics and metaphysics, in
existentialism and other areas. To frame this discussion, we
deem it useful to distinguish between two extreme positions at
either side of an identity continuum: The naturalist world view
(“identity is whole and distinguishable”) and the constructivist
world view (“identity is compartmentalized and shared”; see
Figure 1). Roughly, the naturalist argues that identity is tied
to the properties of an object or a person. In contrast, the
constructivist sees identity as a whole constructed out of the
relationship between objects and subjects. As we will show, both
result in different degrees to which a universal digital identity can
be realized and to what extent such a universal identity is limited
by the identity and rights of others.
Naturalist World View
In a simplified manner, the naturalist worldview assumes that
everything that resides inside the physical body or is more
permanently connected with it forms its identity. It is thus
the nature of the physical body and its delineation from other
physical bodies that make it unique and distinguishable. From
a metaphysical perspective, every physical object has unique
properties, be it the position in space, its texture etc. Two objects
are non-identical if they differ in at least one of their conditions
(e.g., texture, color, composition etc.). Prominent proponents
of this world view in recent times include John Dewey, Ernest
Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars (Papineau, 2016). A
common problem around identity is whether an object can be
distinguished from another, if it does not differ in any of the
conditions that define it as an object. This has already quite
profound consequences for digital identity and corresponding
problems in data protection, particularly when considering the
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use of biometric data for identification purposes (Jasserand, 2018,
p. 155). Since digital identity by necessity is a digitalized and
reduced reflection of what one voluntarily and involuntarily (e.g.,
think “data exhaust” or “data trail”) projects into the digital
sphere, any identity must be sufficiently distinguishable from
other identities. Uniqueness is thus one criterion that derives
from this naturalist world view.
Further assuming that both mind and soul reside in
the physical body, this allows us to draw further relevant
conclusions on identity. For example, Pythagorean and Platonic
transmigration theories (“the wandering soul”) raise a rather
problematic aspect about whether the physical delineations
are correct (Luchte, 2012, p. 174–177). It seems that the
naturalist world view becomes already somewhat inconsistent.
Does identity actually reside within the boundaries of the body,
the soul, or a combination of it? If the answer is Yes, then
the physical body is mostly a vessel with sufficient distinctive
features for identification. The problem becomes even more
pressing as researchers try to use personal profiles on social
media and other “data exhaust” of persons to make them
digitally “immortal” through the use of artificial intelligence,
which also raises the interesting aspect of post-death autonomy
or “post mortem privacy” (Harbinja, 2017). If the body has to
be considered merely as vehicle for the mind, this means for
digital identity and identification that we need to postulate a
Priority Thesis of mind over matter. This is certainly the case
when it comes to questions of uniqueness and of authentication.
If the material body is subject to drastic change that can make
it a sufficient representation for identification (biometrics), then
priority has to be given to the mind for identification (knowledge,
passwords, relationships). This leaves us with the following
elements for identification:
• Physical body (nature): color of eyes, height, hair color,
facial structure, iris, finger, and palm print etc. Essentially,
everything that can be used to create biometrical data. Any of
these features are subject to change and ultimately serve only
as a proxy.
• Non-physical body (nurture): everything that was trained,
what one has absorbed into character, education, training,
behavior to the extent specific to my identity and sufficiently
distinguishable from others. Expressions of the mind in this
category are passwords and phrases (security) questions, and
answers that only a particular user can know, as well as certain
knowledge or abilities.
As argued, two principles of identity and authentication can
be derived from the naturalist worldview: Uniqueness (“being
sufficiently distinguishable from any other entity”) and the
Priority Thesis (“expressions of the mind have priority over
the physical body”). They, however, raise questions themselves.
For example, how distinct from others is an individual if
crucial parts of its identity have been formed by nurture such
as education, culture etc. which are ultimately derived from
other people, and which can also be accessed by other people.
This leads us to the other extreme on the identity continuum,
constructivist identity.
Constructivist Identity
The extreme position of this view proclaims that identity is
wholly shaped by social structure, the relationship with others,
the norms and rules that shape the environment, institutions
that testify to the existence of an identity (e.g., the government
issuing an identity card), and other external factors with which
a person interacts (“look at the person with the funny hat” -
> becomes “person known for wearing a funny hat”). Social
networks, such as LinkedIn and Facebook, very much take this
stance: you are who you are connected with. Your social network
and the nature of the individual relations to others define your
uniqueness. This immediately raises a less discussed subject in the
literature around constructivism, namely its relation to network
theory. A detailed discussion would go beyond the scope of this
primer, but it suffices to say that one important aspect of identity,
namely power or the ability to influence others in network theory
is a function of centrality within the network. This is helpful
when trying to understand how Instagram and Youtube “stars”
are able to leverage their identity for fame and financial gains
(Rueb, 2019).
Constructivism in a less extreme formwould at least argue that
identity is relational (Relationality). In other words, who you are
is a matter of who you relate to and the nature of this relationship.
It is therefore not only the relation of identity X to Y (as existent
or not existent), but also the relation of X to Y as a father to a
son, as brothers, as spouses etc. This view also ties in with the
philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre as he emphasizes that individual
identity is shaped by the interaction with “the other person”
who is difficult to define in detail. While the environment seems
entirely open and explorable to us, the other person is difficult to
grasp, yet exists as an undeniable fact (Sartre, 2007, p. 412–413).
One more philosophical reference that comes to mind is Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave (or Lord
and Bondsman more precisely). Here, identity is also defined
through the role of individuals in society and the relationship
they have with each other (Lichtenthähler, 2019, p. 104–123).
Quite commonly, such relationships and family relationships,
are registered by governments and expressed through
documentation of relational identity such as birth certificates
and the entry of someone’s marital status into public record.
These relational identity features are affecting the legal status of
a person. They also define contractual rights and obligations,
and other societal obligations such as tax payment. Hence, a
public record of these identity features is crucial for society to
work. Furthermore, the change in someone’s identity can also
result in changes for the identity of another person (e.g., with
the death of a spouse the other becomes a widower). If identity
is relational, information about this identity (often referred
to as Personally Identifiable Information or “PII”) can also be
information about another identity. This aspect connects to the
discussion on “data ownership” which is another topic of utmost
importance for the future of cyberspace and its governance as it
takes more and more control of physical infrastructure. It seems
much more complicated than the common discourse suggests,
because data about one person can also be data about another
person. The information that X is friends with Y is a ready
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FIGURE 2 | Median threshold between individual and relational identity.
example of this conundrum as to who owns that information.
Other relational criteria could be education (e.g., relationship
with an educational institution—educational certificate), work
(e.g., employer/employee—contract), culture and religion
(e.g., membership with a religious community), hobbies and
memberships in clubs, as well as membership in political parties.
The crucial question is to what extent an extreme position of
constructivist identity is feasible. After all, such a stance would
be in an uneasy relationship with the principle of uniqueness.
As a result of the discussion on philosophical aspects of
identity, we can postulate the existence of a Median Threshold
that acts as a balance between the naturalist and the constructivist
perspective (see Figure 2). The Median Threshold at the very
least proposes the assumption that either extremes are untenable
positions whether in the theory around identity or in the practice
of digital identity. The truth and technologically most feasible
solutions are probably found somewhere in the middle. For
identity in general and digital identity specifically, one aspect
can however be deduced. Whether identity is derived from
either of these perspectives, they are always expressed in every
individual in the whole of their combinations. In other words,
every individual will contain and express all of the determinant
factors of identity as a whole in itself. “I am a son, a father etc.”
remains also valid in absence of the other person”s presence to
confirm such statements. In summary, this last aspect highlights
a principle of identity without which the idea of universal identity
is not workable:Wholeness.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IDENTITY
In law, the concept of identity is rather badly developed and
dispersed amongst several categories. It can be linked to the
concept of personhood which is difficult to define in detail as
well (Foster and Herring, 2017). We have already mentioned
identity features to which legal consequences are attached, such
as life and death. However, “legal identity” (or personhood) is
also a relevant precondition to be able to sign a contract, being
recognized as child or parent, as well as being entitled to vote
or applying for a public post. However, identity as such is not at
the center of those legal transactions and legal personhood could
be described as a “technical device” (Brozek, 2017, p.12). On an
international and national level, our first association might be
identity cards and passports, which are attached to citizenship.
While many will perceive “their citizenship” as natural and not
further noteworthy, this seemingly evident concept turns out
to be much vaguer and more complex upon closer inspection
(Kochenov, 2009, p. 175–181).
International Law
International law, national law and individual identity are closely
connected in the field of human rights (Mutua, 2016, p. 172–174).
The state decides over the citizenship of a person and has the
right to issue passports and identity cards as an intrinsic property
of statehood and sovereignty. Associated with citizenship is the
international legal prohibition of statelessness. No person should
be without citizenship, because without it one has no legal
recourse (Kochenov, 2009, p. 175–181). Legal personhood as a
universal human right is enshrined in Article 16 of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the UN
(ICCPR) and entails the right to be recognized as a person before
the law (Blitz and Sawyer, 2011, p. 3–4). In short, recognition
as a person with rights and duties is a fundamental aspect of
identity, because it enables a person to enjoy associated elements
that determine daily life and individuality such as:
- The right to life and to personal integrity as enshrined in
Article 6 paragraph 1 ICCPR, as well as prevention from
arbitrary arrest as enshrined in Article 9 paragraph 1 ICCPR:
the naturalist world view is clearly expressed in this right, as
the physical person is protected from any arbitrary interference
into its biological workings and into its liberty of movement5.
- The right to privacy and family life that includes the protection
of honor and confidential correspondence as enshrined in
Article 17 ICCPR (Cannataci, 2017, p. 36–41).
- The freedom of thought, conscience and religion as enshrined
in Article 18 paragraph 1 of the ICCPR: this fundamental
right attaches to the non-physical identity. We already
discussed that the Priority Thesis postulates that the individual
predominantly is an individual because of its mind rather than
its body. In this composite human right, different aspects of
non-physical identity come to the fore: the right to think what
one wants, the right to build ones world view and the right to
adopt any religion one wants (with the caveat that it is usually
up to the state which religions are officially recognized).
- The freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 19
paragraph 1 and 2 ICCPR: as an extension of someone’s non-
physical identity, freedom of expression allows the external
projection of identity, and can be seen as closely connected
to identity.
- Furthermore, minority rights as individual rights to practice
culture and religion are granted to persons who belong to a
certain group identity as enshrined in Article 27 ICCPR.
5As for most human rights there are limitations and derogations possible, as for
protection of the public order and for state of emergencies.
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- Finally, in democratic countries legal identity also extends to
political identity and includes the right to vote and to be
elected. For example, this right is enshrined in Article 3 of the
protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights of the
Council of Europe from 1952.
All of the above shows that specifically within the field of human
rights law, that has its heritage in humanism and individualism
developed particularly during the period of enlightenment
(Morsink, 2012, p. 1–13), individual identity finds several
important elements and protection mechanisms. In addition,
human rights law already determines which aspects of individual
and shared identity are to be recorded to ensure their protection.
We can summarize this as Legal Determinacy of identity. Some
identity aspects are simply a legal necessity, specifically legal
personhood, as they associate with the expression of individual
identity in so many other areas.
National Law
As already stated above many identity aspects that pertain
to human rights are simultaneously relevant internationally
and nationally. This is particularly visible in the case of
European Union citizenship which has a hybrid status between
international and national identity. It adds additional features
for member state citizens while also producing effects for those
who are not citizens of one of the member states of the union
(Kochenov, 2009, p. 234–237). Nevertheless, in addition to the
aforementioned rights states have developed a host of other
identity related norms. As they are being dealt with quite
differently across different legal traditions, this section will treat
only a select few that one quite commonly encounters:
- Property rights and associated duties: ownership is an
important identity characteristic particularly in market
economies. Landownership is a specific subset of property
rights as it is not only governed by contract law, but also
by public law through land registries. This peculiarity stems
from two considerations: First, with land being a high-stake
property landownership deserves an increased protection
by the law. Secondly, since land is placed on the territory
of a state, the state reserves itself the right to govern this
property title and in some states in cases of necessity, e.g., for
the creation of public services, even to disown landowners
(mostly under very strict conditions). Property is associated
with the duty to pay taxes, which is why financial records and
individual taxation form part of individual identity as a citizen
or resident.
- Intellectual property rights: as expression of ownership of the
products of one’s individual mind, these include the rights to
exclusively profit from artistic, technical, and scientific output.
This element is very interesting in today’s data economy as
discourse on data ownership is emerging (Tjong Tijn Tai,
2018). Intellectual property rights pertain to a specific kind of
data one is producing and that protects property of data of a
certain quality with regards to artistic and intellectual qualities.
As the value of personal data shifts, and as personal data has
become a commodity much value, the threshold of artistic and
FIGURE 3 | Socio-legal thresholds regarding the individual ownership of data.
intellectual quality of data needs to shift in favor of the person
producing the data.
In summary, both international and national law impose a
minimum set of data that by law is associated with the individual
in most countries. In answer to the question of whether the
individual would own a lot of data or very little, the legal
requirements already indicated that no ownership of data around
the identity as a citizen is not plausible. At the same time, as
already indicated in the section on constructivist identity, much
of what concerns identity data is relational data (e.g., being a
mother relates to one’s children, being a teacher to one’s school
and pupil etc.). This relational data is per definition data that
concerns more than one entity. This means, the rights of one
person to such relational identity data endwhere another person’s
rights start. This naturally leads to a socio-legal threshold of a
minimum and a maximum ownership of data (see Figure 3).
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL
THRESHOLDS OF DIGITAL IDENTITY
Summarizing what has been stated above in the sections
on philosophical and legal aspects of identity, we observed
that identity is generally regarded as a mixture of individual
determination and relational aspects. While the naturalist world
view establishes identity as a concept that hinges on the concept
of uniqueness of any identity, it also evokes questions on
the priority thesis or the dependence and interaction of an
individual with its environment and society. Proponents of a
constructivist identity emphasize relationality while questions
of identity as a complete individual entity (wholeness) remain.
As we went further to consider the legal domain, we observed
that particularly in the human rights space identity is determined
by several individual rights that states are obliged to grant to
individuals (legal determinacy). Furthermore, aspects around
the ownership of material and immaterial goods ultimately
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FIGURE 4 | Digital identity space.
highlight the issue of data ownership which could be essential
to manifest fundamental and simple rights in the digital domain.
Bringing all the above together, allows us to hypothesis a
space of digital identity that is both a compromise between
the socio-legal threshold, as well as the median threshold
between individual and relational identity conceptions. Figure 4
visualizes this complex triangulation of philosophical and socio-
legal conceptions about identity and highlights requirements
which the digitization of identity—including DLT—might have
to live up to:
DIGITAL IDENTITY CASES
While Blockchain and other DLTs (e.g., Ethereum, Hyperledger
Indy, Veres One, IOTA) enable new paradigms of identity
management (Blockchain Bundesverband, 2018), we strive to
develop an initial categorization of digital identity schemes.
As we continue to explore digital identity by portraying case
studies of pilots in the public and private sector, including
such implementing DLT, “self-sovereign identity,” and ZKP,
we will first briefly consider the drivers and trends that
create the demand and opportunity for the digitization of
identity management.
Digitization of Identity Management
Our digital and physical lives are becoming increasingly
interlinked through apps and services. Our digital representation
is embodied in the many versions and usages of digital identity
through which we interact. While there are many reasons for
these developments, we wish to highlight three trends that create
demand for enhanced digital identities:
1. Necessity to improve process management and information
security to protect against cybercrime and identity theft.
2. The feature of decentralization as an enabling factor for
the individual.
3. The desire for increased participation in, as well as increased
access and efficiency of social service provision and access to
the economy.
To discuss the first trend, we should start with establishing
that traditionally identity management encompasses a broad
spectrum of instrumental identities, which serve the purpose of
identification within a specific system or network. In a 2018
report on identity in a digital world of the World Economic
Forum three archetypes are described:
• Centralized identity systems, where a single organization
establishes and manages identity. This is typical for the direct
relationship between a state and the individual. Examples
include a government electoral roll, or a land registry system,
but also the relationship with private actors such as a bank.
• Federated identity systems, where different public and private
institutions establish stand-alone systems. These systems are
subsequently linked through agreements or regulation and
each of the managing institutions of the systems becomes a
trust-anchor. This allows for some re-purposing of identity
credentials, yet the activity remains driven by the initial
purpose. For example, a driving license has the primary
purpose to show the ability of someone to drive a vehicle,
while it might also be used occasionally to prove age in other
societal contexts.
• Decentralized identity systems, where the individual is at
the center and institutions or private corporations just add
(verified) credentials to a central “identity hub”, “application”,
or “vault” that is controlled by the individual. In such a system,
digital identity is initially purpose-free and becomes a resource
or an asset as credentials are acquired (World Economic
Forum, 2018b, p. 13–16).
As we will show below when discussing case studies, this last
approach of decentralized identity management is becoming
more and more popular. As the digital sphere emerges, one of the
biggest challenges of siloed approaches of central and federated
systems is that they overburden users with identity management.
Many different accounts to access their digital identities for each
use case are necessary. Already in 2015, it was estimated that in
the United States an average e-mail address is associated with 130
digital accounts (Le Bras, 2015). Unsurprisingly, “identity theft”
has become one of the major cyberthreats and most common
cybercrimes that enables numerous fraudulent activities (Wall,
2013, p. 438–440). Furthermore, the weakness of such systems
lies not only on the side of the individual. Data leaks have
become a massive problem, as two data protection related fines
of the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office
(ICO) of 2019 illustrate. As a result of an investigation, the
international hotel group Marriott was fined almost £100m after
hackers stole the records of 339 million guests (Sweney, 2019b).
In another case that led the ICO to levy the largest fine to
date in applying the European Union General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), the airline British Airways was required to
pay £183m in compensation after it was found that an extensive
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 7 May 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 26
Zwitter et al. Digital Identity and the Blockchain
amount of data (including login, payment card, name, address,
and travel booking) of 500.000 users was stolen (Sweney, 2019a).
Hence, there is a clear necessity to improve process management
and information security in order to be able to use the digital
sphere for meaningful exchanges of information and services.
However, this is not the only way to describe the ongoing
transformation. Another important factor in this development
is the question who or which entity is controlling/”owning”
identity related information. Traditionally, the ownership of
such identities lies with the issuer of the credentials, since
this is also the institution that is guaranteeing for validity and
thereby establishing trust. Hence, artifacts that prove identity
such as passports need to be paid for, or the information
associated with identity is monetized by private corporations in
one of the manifold schemes of “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff,
2019, p. 10–29). With decentralization however, this pattern
might be changing. When focusing on this governance layer of
digital identities, three types can be distinguished (Gstrein and
Kochenov, 2020):
• Centralized Top-Down-Approach, such as for example
applied in the world’s largest digital identity program
“Aadhaar” that is administered by the Unique Identification
Authority of India since 20096. This is a centralized system
with more than 1.2 billion enrolled users that is not DLT
based, but hinges heavily on biometrics to identify users (Rao,
2019), which is also discussed in the context of digital identity
systems supported by DLT. The main purpose of Aadhaar is
to improve social service provision, while critics fear that it
is applied in inappropriate contexts as well. Such “mission
creep” might affect the potential for development of groups
negatively, and disproportionately limit individual privacy
(Privacy International, 2018).
• Individual Incentive Programs, such as for example the E-
residence scheme of Estonia. Essentially, individuals become
virtual residents of Estonia which gives them a platform to
operate from regardless of where they originate from. With
this, a country tries to get more attractive for investment, or
individuals who would like to setup a business. It can also
be tied to other policy objectives such as emphasizing certain
characteristics of a government, as well as creating a national
brand (Poleshchuk, 2016).
• Community-Based Bottom-Up Approach, such as the
decentralized identity platform Forus in the Netherlands7.
We discuss it in more detail in the case studies below. Such
systems are decentralized by design and entirely user focused.
Platforms like Forus develop features incrementally as they
grow from concrete use scenarios within communities to
regional and potentially global relevance.
Another promise of putting the individual “in charge” of its
own identity management has to do with aspects of social
participation and the third trend creating demand for enhanced
digital identities. Although it is often a non-issue for individuals
6Available online at: https://uidai.gov.in/about-uidai/unique-identification-
authority-of-india/about.html (accessed September 13, 2019).
7Available online at: https://forus.io (accessed March 4, 2020).
living in developed countries, many people across the world
are excluded from the social ecosystem as they cannot prove
their identity. The World Bank Group estimated in 2018 that
globally ∼1 billion people face challenges when proving their
identity (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 3). The UN acknowledged
this pressing need in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)
16.9, which enshrines a right to legal identity for all, including
birth certificates. However, this requires a complete overhaul
of the way identities are managed on a national and global
scale and will take years if not decades to change. Here, DLT
based digital identities may become a catalyst for change, but it
remains to be seen how countries which are at times struggling
with basic infrastructural needs will be able to leapfrog toward
fully decentralized digital identity. Nevertheless, according to an
estimation by theWorld Economic Forum published in late 2018,
there will be 150 million people with blockchain based identities
by 2022 (World Economic Forum, 2018a, p. 19).
Case Studies in the Public Sector
Public-based digital identity solutions revolve around citizenship
and the usage in the interaction with public and private
institutions. Governments provide individuals with a variety
of different services which are becoming increasingly available
online (Schou and Hjelholt, 2018, p. 112–115). The digitization
of governmental service includes the need for a safe, portable
and easily accessible digital identity. Currently, the only “top-
down” implemented use case of a (partly) blockchain-based
national identity is Estonia which has established one of the
most technologically advanced national ID-card systems. The
mandatory card allows access to all secure e-services (Sullivan
and Burger, 2017), including travel within the EU, national health
insurance, access to bank accounts, e-voting, the administration
of medical records, and even tax claims 8.
The physical card is protected with 384-bit ECC public key
encryption and can also be used within a digital environment
for verification. It utilizes blockchain technology to ensure the
validity of the personal information, whilst allowing full control
and portability. During a brief period in November 2017 the
system could not be used due to a security problem resulting
from a design vulnerability of the chip on the card. Estonia’s
administration reacted quickly, but the incident raised the
question how countries with more than ∼1.5 million residents
could address such a crisis that entails going back to traditional
administrative methods, as well as addressing the security issue
by potentially having to replace all cards in use (Asmae, 2017).
Nevertheless, the implementation of the system is generally
regarded as a success. Although the identity is sometimes
deemed “self-sovereign”, since the flow of information is fully
controlled by the identity owner, there are restrictions in terms
of usage. Hence, it could be argued that this system does
not represent a pure embodiment of the self-sovereign identity
concept and should not be considered as such. Furthermore,
it has to be mentioned that this system focusing on Estonian
citizens is different from the E-residence scheme of Estonia that
8Available online at: https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-identity/id-card (accessed
March 4, 2020).
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has been described in the governance-focused categorization
as an example for individual incentive programs. E-residence
is oriented toward foreigners which wish to use Estonia as a
business hub. Besides Estonia, such programs seem particularly
interesting for countries with a track record in investment
migration (Surak, 2016, p. 8–13).
However, the most successful solutions in the public sector
aiming at the implementation of decentralization and DLT
enabled self-sovereign identity management are based on the
Community-based bottom-up model. One example for such
a platform is being built in the north of the Netherlands
by the foundation Forus9. Together with the community
of Zuidhorn/Westerkwartier in the province of Groningen a
solution to digitize social service provision was developed and
implemented from 2017 to March 2018 (Velthuijs, 2018). The
main aim of the system is to support children from non-
privileged families (“Kindpakket”). During a process of intensive
collaboration with the municipality and other partners from the
private sector, Forus built an easy to use system for administrative
purposes. It allows parents to efficiently and quickly receive
funding for children who require financial aid (Van der Beek,
2018). The platform uses DLT and particularly self-sovereign
identity as core design elements, as well as ZKP mechanisms
to limit the exchange of raw personal data. It is designed to
use cryptocurrency (typically Ethereum) as much as possible.
However, it can also be used with traditional currency (Euro)
when linked to a Dutch bank account. The basic design of
interaction entails four roles: the applicant who uses a digital
identity application (“Me”), merchants and service providers
that register for the platform and also have digital identities,
sponsors like public or private institutions that provide funds
for which the users can apply, as well as validating parties that
confirm credentials if needed. The open-source platform has in
the meanwhile also been used for other projects in communities
in the Netherlands10, and continues to be developed adding new
features and use cases.11
Similar to Forus, Kiva12 is a decentralized digital identity
platform that is being developed and implemented since 2018 in
Sierra Leone (Wang and De Filippi, 2020, p. 11-14). Although
the system has the support of the central government, it is
currently rather limited in reach and is iteratively developed
with a small community of users (Wang and De Filippi, 2020,
p. 11). Hence, this development can also be considered as
a community-based approach that evolves step-by-step. Kiva
has the main objective of facilitating the creation of credit
history. The system tries to make credit markets accessible for
“unbanked people” via the creation of a secure digital identity
and stimulates economic development through microloans. It is
based onHyperledger Indy as underlying blockchain layer.While
the first implementation steps of Kiva seem promising, current
9https://forus.io (accessed March 1, 2020).
10The webshop of the community of Nijmegen with an explanation of the scheme
is available via. Available online at: https://nijmegen.forus.io (accessed March
4, 2020).
11Available online at: https://github.com/teamforus (accessed March 4, 2020).
12Available online at: https://www.kiva.org/protocol (accessed March 1, 2020).
practice is still reliant on guardian- and custodianship. While
technically designed to enable identity management along the
paradigms of self-sovereign identity with the use of ZKP, lacking
technological infrastructure and limited technical knowledge
among users highlight that it still will take some time until such
solutions can be implemented without friction. At least during
this transition period there is a need for concrete governance
frameworks that limit and mitigate risks, particularly relating to
privacy and individual autonomy (Wang and De Filippi, 2020,
p. 13–14).
While these two projects are very promising, it should not be
overlooked that manymore projects using the Community-based
bottom-up approach exist in other parts of the world. Without
trying to provide a enumerative list of pilots at the time of writing,
initiatives in Austria (Danube Tech), Canada (British Columbia;
TheOrgBook), Spain (Alastria), Switzerland (City of Zug; UPort
and ti&m), and the United States of America (Illinois Blockchain
initiative; Blockchain Bundesverband, 2018, p. 54–56) can be
mentioned. Potentially, the relative success of the Community-
based bottom-up approach can be explained when considering
the aspect that a lot of the difficult questions relating to
philosophical and legal aspects of identity are not as pressing on a
community level, or are relatively easy to remedy with pragmatic
workarounds facilitated by smaller institutional settings.
The digital identity systems described in this section usually
use a publicly verifiable digital signature showing governmental
approval and are therefore recognized. Hence, these identities
could also be used to communicate with other (semi-)public
institutions (e.g., hospitals), as well as civil society organizations
(CSOs). In this area DLT-based electronic patient records
are among the most prominent use cases for pilots. Many
organizations such as Medicalchain, MedRec, and MediBloc are
focusing on building decentralized record management systems
for electronic health records which comply with the regulatory
framework (Ekblaw et al., 2016). Nevertheless, medical records
are highly sensitive and require utmost care when sharing with
other institutions. Still, interoperability and more patient control
would be highly desirable as most hospitals work with siloed
databases, which can lead to fragmented information regarding
the patient and its medical needs. Additionally, inappropriate
regulations such as those in the United States have halted the
implementation of such solutions (Salzman, 2018).
The digitization of identity management is certainly also
appealing in a cross-border context. For example, Dubai
partnered with a startup from the United Kingdom named
ObjectTech to ensure blockchain-based security measures for
the airport. ObjectTech has been working alongside the Dubai
Immigration and Visas department to develop digital passports
which allow for the elimination of manual checks. At the time
of writing it is being stated that Dubai will also introduce
a fully developed self-sovereign identity system. However, use
cases outside traveling scenarios are not available. The proposed
solution is a marriage between a blockchain-based authentication
system and biometric verification of an individual (Zhao, 2017).
The role of DLT remains limited to the management and
validation of the data once it has been registered. Hence, DLT
does not aid in ensuring the validity of the submitted data.
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Currently, emerging technologies capable of addressing this issue
hinge on the use of biometric identification, which in turn has its
own legal and ethical constraints as we know from other fields
of application such as surveillance (Jasserand, 2018, p. 154–165).
We will further elaborate on this aspect in the discussion.
To conclude this section, there are also cases where
governments are unable to provide citizens with humanitarian
aid they require due to natural or man-made disasters. As
we have already briefly mentioned in the introduction of this
article, decentralization, DLT, and self-sovereign identity could
potentially remedy the failure of public institutions. Several use
cases have already been recorded in the humanitarian domain,
where the Word Food Programme and other agencies have
successfully implemented digital identity solutions (Zwitter and
Boisse-Despiaux, 2018; Wang and De Filippi, 2020, p. 14–16).
In the process of humanitarian intervention and aid,
beneficiaries are registered to ensure an organized process of aid
delivery. This enables aid organizations to track the amount of
people they helped and in what manner, e.g., number of vouchers
for providing food or shelter. Corporations such as Tykn and
Aid:Tech are prominent examples in this field, as they both have
developed and implemented solutions in such environments.
Aid:Tech has collaborated with the UNWorld Food Programme
in 2018 and built a wallet with biometric verification for refugees
(Juskalian, 2018). With this, highly vulnerable individuals are
able to buy items at stores in the camp without requiring a
physical wallet (Zambrano et al., 2018). Tykn built a solution in
collaboration with the 510-data team of the Dutch Red Cross
that has the aim to provide humanitarian aid through data
and digital products13. Following the destruction by Hurricane
Irma in 2017, a pilot was tested on the island of St. Martin to
use DLT for to manage disaster relief funds. After setting up a
“digital wallet”, users would be able to receive digital vouchers,
which they could use purchase food, water and other relief goods
(Erjula, 2018). Both systems hinge on the self-sovereign identity
concept where beneficiaries can manage their own information
and have full agency.
Case Studies in the Private Sector
In many ways, digital identity systems using DLT, self-sovereign
identity and ZKP can be understood as a response to the
commodification of digital identity by powerful private Internet
corporations such as Facebook, or Google. After all, the original
intention of Blockchain was to get independent of centralized
institutions and trust anchors (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1). DLT-based
identity solutions for the private sector are very similar to those
described in the previous section, with the focus on leveraging
blockchain for (cross-border, cross-system) interoperability, data
agency, and potentially also compliance with new regulations
such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
(Finck, 2018b). The possibilities for DLT-based identity solutions
in the private sector are frequently intertwined with those
in the public sector as some require verified credentials by
governmental institutions.
13Available online at: https://www.510.global (accessed February 22, 2020).
When considering concrete applications in the private sector,
know-your-customer (KYC) related solutions are a prominent
example. Due to insufficient human resources and volume of
regulatory change many companies struggle with the escalating
costs and complexity in their KYC process. For the year 2016
it was estimated that financial institutions and their corporate
customers spent ∼$500 million annually for KYC processes
worldwide (Harrop and Mairs, 2016). A partnership between
PwC, Onfido and uPort has tried to address this issue with a
more efficient solution, potentially used for consumer identities
in UK financial services. The ConsenSys-backed uPort showcases
the self-sovereign aspect as users can manage the transfer of
their own identifiable information, keys and data through their
personal device (Wood, 2019).
Another application lies in the area of verification of
governmental identity to drive innovations such as e-mobility.
In a partnership between Deutsche Telekom, Riddle&Code,
Bundesdruckerei and Jolocom a digital identity solution was
developed. First, users are verified in person by Bundesdruckerei.
Once their identity is confirmed, they can upload their traditional
German identity cards into a smart wallet to get access to e-
scooters (Habel, 2019). This pilot seems particularly interesting,
since such systems could remove the requirement to create a new
account when signing up to a new mobility service. However,
from the description of the pilot it is not clear whether and how
payment could be handled.
A closely related example is age limit control. For example,
when age verification is needed (e.g., buying alcoholic beverages,
entrance permission to a venue), the age of the client needs to
be verified. In many cases this is done by the provider checking
the customers identity card. However, this typically means the
customer has to share more personal data than required, as
identity documents such as driving licenses, identity cards, or
passports include much more information than needed for this
purpose. Hence, it seems useful to look into the feasibility of
ZKP. In a collaboration between Budweiser and Civic at the
2018 Consensus conference they aimed to showcase the value
of ZKP for age verification to buy a Budweiser (Capilnean,
2018). For the pilot, Civic provided a digital wallet where the
governmental identity document was stored and digitally signed
for verification purposes. The wallet is run in a digital device
such as a smartphone, which is also used to scan a QR code on
a vending machine that provides beer. The vending machine is
instructed to only dispense beer to those over the age of 21.While
the trial worked as such, some participants had to wait for more
than 20min to be served by the machine. Maybe this might not
be untypical in current real-life circumstances when waiting for a
beer in a busy bar, but it highlights that ZKPs might be working
slower than expected, and are potentially limited in terms of
scalability. Nevertheless, it seems not unlikely that the technology
will continue to improve and increase efficiency over time.
DISCUSSION
Throughout this piece we are aspiring at describing and framing
the changing landscape in the management of digital identity.
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As we have illustrated several of the most promising use cases in
the public and private sector, we are now turning to discuss the
potential implications of these innovations on the power balance
between the individual, government, and corporations. Since
this is a subject of immense breadth and where many societal
disciplines and fields play a role (Finck, 2018a, p. 182–209), we
choose to do so through the application of the lenses of individual
and group privacy, as well as considerations on suitable backup-
mechanisms for DLT based digital identity systems.
The discussion of privacy is useful, since the topic is a
proxy for the division between the sphere of the individual and
the sphere of the public (Cannataci, 2017, p. 36–41). We also
highlighted this aspect in the section focusing on philosophical
perspectives about identity, particularly when considering the
constructivist perspective. It must be emphasized however, that
privacy should not only be interpreted as a defensive right.
As the UN has acknowledged throughout its work on privacy
in the digital age, privacy also has an enabling character
allowing the individual to develop its views on the world
and itself (United Nations, 2016, p. 2). While the concept of
self-sovereign identity has many elements that strengthen the
individual in its position against governments and corporations,
only final products and concrete applications will show whether
this promise materializes. For example, when analyzing how
responsibilities of controllers could be applied for operating
Bitcoin in the regulatory framework of the EU GDPR, there
remain uncertainties whether the collective—as partnership—is
responsible within the meaning of Article 4 paragraph 7 GDPR,
or its individual members are joint controllers under Article 26
GDPR (Buocz et al., 2019, p. 196). In other words, it is impossible
to claim individual rights, if it is unclear who precisely has a
responsibility of respecting, protecting and promoting them.
Furthermore, potential tensions should be considered on
questions such as the private and public nature of data,
enforcement of concrete individual rights (e.g., amendment,
access, erasure/”right to be forgotten”, etc.), data protection by
design and default, and other requirements of state of the art
data protection law (Finck, 2018b, p. 26–32). While proponents
of DLT might question the relevance of high data protection
standards for the operation of innovative digital identity systems,
since the underlying assumptions of data protection might
seem outdated as such to them, it is also fair to remain a
believer in the core principles enshrined in regulations such
as GDPR. Currently, GDPR and international agreements such
as Convention 108+ of the Council of Europe represent two
of the few effective safeguards preventing the Facebook, or
“Googlization” of Everything (Vaidhyanathan, 2012). This is even
more relevant in a time in which whole groups are unaware
of the fact that the deployment and use of omnipresent digital
technology is significantly affecting—if not eradicating—their
opportunity for informational self-determination (Taylor et al.,
2017, p. 226–234). As digitization is on the verge of defining
what human identity is, and should be worth, these aspects
become even more important to address. Hence, if DLT is about
to take over identity management in the digital age, for which
there are many good practical reasons, and if such identities
should be “good identities” enabling a dignified co-existence
(World Economic Forum, 2018a, p. 17), the technology also
needs to be designed in a way in which classical privacy and
data protection safeguards, as well as individual remedies are
embedded by default.
However, regardless of how much identity will be digitized,
one aspect that probably will have to remain tied to the
physical domain is the backup-mechanism for DLT based digital
identities. If a device containing a self-sovereign identity gets
lost, stolen, or broken, or if the user forgets its access key,
there must be a way to restore agency over such elemental
information. Many options currently discussed circle around
the use of biometrics to generate and potentially restore access
to digital wallets, or identity hubs. While biometrics have the
advantage that they are relatively persistent and cannot get lost,
these characteristics are also the basis for why their omnipresent
use can be dangerous.
Once biometrical characteristics of a person are registered, it
is possible to paint incredibly detailed pictures of someone’s life
and interactions. This is often attached to completely unintended
consequences, as an example from humanitarian aid shows. In
2019 the UN World Food Programme demanded from Houthi
officials in Yemen to allow for the deployment of biometric
technologies like iris scans and digital fingerprints to monitor
suspected fraud during food distribution (Lontero, 2019). The
refusal by the Houthi officials to deploy biometrical recognition
over surveillance concerns lead to the cancellation of the aid
efforts. This development was met with criticism on the initial
demand, claiming that the UN’s action was disproportionate
and resulting in harm for the weakest (Martin and Taylor,
2019). However, this incident is not the only indication that the
widespread, pervasive, and under-considered use of biometrics
for identification purposes results in negative outcomes.
The Indian Aadhaar system hinges heavily on the use of
biometrics. While the use of Aadhaar by private corporations
has been limited by the Indian Supreme Court in a high-profile
judgment from 26 September 2018 (Indian Supreme Court,
2018), the appropriateness of the dependency on biometrics was
acknowledged as such. The judges came to the conclusion that the
information security regarding the management of the biometric
data of more than 1.2 billion people stored in a centralized system
can be guaranteed by the government.Without speculating about
the threat of the government itself abusing this power, only
time will tell if the finding is true and whether the data can be
kept safe from attackers. As stated in the dissenting judgment
from Justice Chandrachud: “The invisible threads of a society
networked on biometric data have grave portents for the future.
Unless the law mandates an effective data protection framework,
the quest for liberty and dignity would be as ephemeral as the
wind.” (Indian Supreme Court, 2018, p. 337) Therefore, the use
of biometrics as backup mechanism for digital identities requires
at least well thought through and detailed oversight and review
procedures, coupled with the possibility to demand review of
decisions and management practice on the basis of individual
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request. Ultimately however, it might be desirable to consider
other backup-mechanisms which are safer and have less potential
for undesirable and dangerous side-effects. The use of biometric
data might be part of the solution to this problem, but not the
solution as such (Wang and De Filippi, 2020, p. 8–9).
Furthermore, a crucial question of power balance remains.
Even if the individual might have full control over his/her
credentials and the information contained in a decentralized
identitymanagement system, the control over the network and its
design remain in the hands of those developing and maintaining
the underpinning technological infrastructure. Furthermore, the
choice of whether or not to have a digital identity in the future
will equal the choice of whether or not to use applications like
Facebook or WeChat, that have become omnipresent quasi-
standards in many societies. The same network effect that
makes it convenient to use these tools creates social pressure,
particularly for those who refuse to use them. It should not
be taken for granted that advanced digital identities fix these
issues. They might as well enable an era of “neo-feudalism” and
increased social division, especially if their implementation is
done naïvely purely focusing on questions of technical feasibility
(Gstrein and Kochenov, 2020).
Bringing the empirical cases together with the theoretical
elaborations yields quite interesting results. On the meta-level, it
becomes clear that the practice of digital identity management
and the theoretical conceptions of uniqueness, relationality and
legal determinacy remain relatively disconnected. The concept
of legal determinacy is best represented as both private and
public sector projects in general are aware and try to abide
by legal frameworks such as the GDPR. Almost exclusively,
however, most projects focus on the individual as a bearer of
identity rights; relational aspects of identity and the problems
that will emerge around data protection and data ownership
in these cases seem to have no priority for stakeholders in
both sectors.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of DLT and the abundance of private and
public sector initiatives, as well as the emergent debate around
digital identity, make it profusely clear how important it is to
gain a profound understanding of the legal and philosophical
conceptions and norms that govern identity in general. A
sound framework of digital identity management needs to take
into account questions of privacy, relationality of identity data,
and data ownership. Ultimately, specifically the direct relation
between the philosophical conception of identity and its socio-
legal foundations, as elaborated in this article, can serve as a
foundation toward defining the “self-sovereign” individual with
its rights, obligations and limitations.
At the same time, a digital identity management framework
is not pre-determined by certain ideas around DLT such as
decentralization and immutability. If anything, DLT has enriched
the governance toolkit. Public and private sector actors can
select among a range of top-down to bottom-up management
approaches. Even if decentralization is “en vogue” at the moment
in both, the governance debate as well as amongst blockchain
advocates, it is by no means a panacea for all old ailments.
DLT can be a part of useful solutions, but only if it can
incorporate socio-legal and philosophical necessities that digital
identity brings with it. Once translated well into practice, DLT
has the capacity to strengthen the rights of the individual by
providing access to tools that enhance the individual’s agency as
self-sovereign actor.
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